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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  Summary 
Indian Tribes in the United States generally lack authority to criminally prosecute 
non-Indians accused of violating tribal laws and victimizing tribal citizens within the 
Tribe’s Indian Country.1 Additionally, the Supreme Court has strictly curtailed the ability 
of Tribes to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-members of the Tribe. These jurisdictional 
barriers have set the stage for a law and order crisis on the reservations that is appalling in 
its scope. 
This paper proposes a partial solution, one that Indian Tribes can implement unilat-
erally based on their inherent sovereign authority as recognized under federal law. Tribes 
can maximize the reach of their law enforcement powers by enacting civil law enforcement 
codes that are designed to meet the Supreme Court’s restrictive standards for such author-
ity. Careful draftsmanship should help these tribal enforcement actions survive collateral 
review in federal court, particularly if tribal justice systems adhere to the highest standards 
of procedural fairness while exercising these powers. 
This paper has five parts. After a brief introduction to the problem in Part I.B., Part 
II surveys the law of tribal jurisdiction over non-members in Indian Country, focusing on 
the extent to which federal courts review the exercise of tribal civil adjudications over non-
Indians. Part III discusses how doctrines of judicial deference to legislative fact-finding 
and policy choices can be used to support tribal civil enforcement codes against federal 
court review. Part IV proposes a method for Tribes to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians in Indian Country, designed to survive collateral review in federal or state court. 
Part V concludes the argument, and is followed by an Appendix setting forth model tribal 
civil enforcement code provisions consistent with this paper’s recommendations. 
B. Background 
In the fall of 2012, at a tribal casino in northeastern Oklahoma, casino security of-
ficers apprehended a non-Indian in his attempt to steal a non-Indian casino patron’s wal-
let.2 The victim—a lifelong Oklahoma ranch woman and a great grandmother—caught the 
thief in the act, chased him down and cornered him long enough for the security officers 
to respond. The security officers confiscated the suspect’s casino rewards card and photo-
copied his driver’s license. The suspect was then allowed to leave. 
The victim, wishing to press charges, waited more than two hours for tribal police 
officers to arrive and take her statement. It is unlikely that her diligent efforts resulted in 
                                                 
 1. Indian Country is defined to include “(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States . . . , (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States 
. . . , and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1151. 
“Although this definition by its terms relates only to federal criminal jurisdiction,” the Supreme Court “recog-
nize[s] that it also generally applies to questions of civil jurisdiction.” Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal 
Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998). 
 2. Letter from the victim to the author (Dec. 3, 2013) (on file with the Tulsa Law Review). 
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any charges against the perpetrator. Under federal law, neither the Tribe nor the federal 
government have jurisdiction to prosecute a crime between non-Indians in Indian Coun-
try.3 The tribal officers’ only recourse was to turn the information over to the state law 
enforcement agencies. 
Purse-snatching at tribal casinos is hardly the worst crime plaguing Indian Country. 
Experts who study violence and rape against Indian women repeatedly invoke the same 
word: “epidemic.”4 Congress agrees.5 As a recent report by the bipartisan Tribal Law and 
Order Commission found, 
 
American Indian and Alaska Native communities and lands are fre-
quently less safe—and sometimes dramatically more dangerous—than 
most other places in our country. Ironically, the U.S. government, which 
has a trust responsibility for Indian Tribes, is fundamentally at fault for 
this public safety gap. Federal government policies have displaced and 
diminished the very institutions that are best positioned to provide 
trusted, accountable, accessible, and cost-effective justice in Tribal com-
munities.6 
 
One scholar recently compiled the following—shocking—statistics: 
 
 Native American women suffer violent crime at the highest rates in the 
United States. 
 34% of Native women will be raped in their lifetimes. 39% will suffer 
domestic violence. 
 On many reservations, Native women are murdered at a rate more than 
ten times the national average. 
. . . . 
 Non-Indians commit over eighty percent of the rapes and sexual assaults 
                                                 
 3. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 
621 (1881). The federal government may prosecute crimes which violate substantive federal criminal law, see, 
e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2007), but the federal criminal code is not designed to cover 
run-of-the-mill offenses such as the purse-snatching at issue here. 
 4. See, e.g., United States Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Attorney General Holder An-
nounces Violence Against Women Tribal Prosecution Task Force in Indian Country, THE U.S. JUSTICE 
DEPARTMENT (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/January/11-ag-086.html (“Violence against 
American Indian women occurs at epidemic rates.”); NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, THE 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT REAUTHORIZATION—S.1925, available at http://www.ncai.org/attach-
ments/PolicyPaper_TqvRDRNQQFuaiPDUQxUdGaYcPjTQierPUnfIlTFMpPSlfUVUYNk_Tribal%20Talk-
ing%20Points_021512.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2014) (“Violence against Native women has reached epidemic 
proportions.”); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Addressing the Epidemic of Domestic Violence in Indian Country by 
Restoring Tribal Sovereignty, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POLICY, 11 (Mar. 2009), 
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Fletcher%20Issue%20Brief.pdf (“Violence against women in Indian 
Country is an epidemic.”).  
 5. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261 (codified as amended in 
various sections of 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.), §202(a)(5)(A) (stating that “do-
mestic and sexual violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women has reached epidemic propor-
tions”). 
 6. INDIAN LAW AND ORDER COMMISSION at v, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER, (Nov. 
2013), available at http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/.  
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against Indian women.7 
 
Thus, it was no exaggeration when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently rec-
ognized that “Indian Country may be one of the most dangerous places in the United 
States.”8 Sexual predators take advantage of the difficulties enforcing the rule of law on 
Indian reservations, targeting women and children with little or no risk of prosecution.9 
International drug cartels and human traffickers bring their illicit business into Indian 
Country, often with the assistance—voluntary or otherwise—of the local community.10 
Jurisdictional uncertainty and the inability of tribal governments to enforce the laws within 
their own territories is a major contributor to the lawlessness and victimization that is ram-
pant in Indian communities.11 
Some Indian Tribes have developed innovative methods to enforce tribal laws 
against non-Indians in Indian Country. In the infamous “Yellow Hummer Case,”12 the Mus-
cogee (Creek) Nation (“Creek Nation”) brought a civil forfeiture action against a vehicle 
that transported methamphetamine onto the Tribe’s casino property. The perpetrator drove 
into the casino parking lot on the evening of June 15, 2004.13 Illegally parking his yellow 
2004 GM H2 model Humvee in a handicapped space, the suspect took methamphetamine 
in the parking lot before venturing into the casino.14 The casino’s security personnel sus-
pected illegal activity and contacted the Creek Nation Lighthorse police department.15 
When the suspect returned to the vehicle, Lighthorse policemen were on the scene.16 The 
suspect gave the officers permission to search the vehicle, and the officers discovered 
$1,463.14 in cash and 6.8 grams of methamphetamine.17 
The tribal officers issued a civil citation for disorderly conduct, pursuant to the Creek 
                                                 
 7. Ryan D. Dreveskracht, House Republicans Add Insult to Native Women’s Injury, 3 U. MIAMI RACE & 
SOC. JUST. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2013), available at http://race-and-social-justice-review.law.miami.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/House-Republicans-Add-Insult-to-Native-Women’s-Injury.pdf (footnotes omitted). 
 8. Los Coyote Band of Cahuilla & Cupeno Indians v. Jewell, 729 F.3d 1025, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2013) (com-
piling additional statistics). 
 9. Dreveskracht, supra note 7, at 7 n.21. 
 10. “[I]nternational drug traffickers exploit the complicated jurisdictional rules and prosecutorial indifference 
to establish drug operations in Indian Country, often with devastating results for the community.” Los Coyote 
Band, 729 F.3d at 1029 (citing a 2011 study published by the Government Accountability Office); see also 
Michel Martin, Indian Reservations Grapple with Drug Trafficking, Tell Me More, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO 
(June 15, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128539859 (Interview with Tohono 
O’Odham Nation Director of Public Safety Ed Raina: “People are through various means induced to participate 
by offering substantial amounts of money to transport or store, within their communities. On occasions, some 
are forced to, through threats.”); Sara Kershaw, Drug Traffickers Find Haven in the Shadows of Indian Country, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/national/19smuggle.html?page-
wanted=all&_r=0 (“[O]n a growing number of reservations, drug traffickers . . . are marrying Indian women to 
establish themselves on reservations.”). 
 11. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIAN WOMEN 
FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE U.S.A. 27-38 (2007), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/mazeo-
finjustice.pdf; NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 4; Dreveskracht, supra note 7, at 8-11 
(collecting sources). 
 12. Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. $ 1463.14, S.C. 05-01, 4 Mvs. L. Rep 253 (Creek Nation 2005) [hereinafter 
Yellow Hummer Case]; see also Miner Electric Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 13. Yellow Hummer Case, S.C. 05-01, 4 Mvs. L. Rep. at 258.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. at 258-59.  
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Nation civil enforcement code.18 The Tribe also seized the drugs, money, and the Humvee 
under the Tribe’s civil forfeiture statute.19 The suspect voluntarily paid the $250 civil pen-
alty but challenged the seizure of the Humvee.20 The Creek Nation Supreme Court upheld 
the seizure, holding that: 
 
[T]he [Creek] Nation possesses the authority to regulate public safety 
through civil laws . . . [and] civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over forfeiture 
proceedings including the forfeiture of . . . vehicles used to transport or 
conceal controlled dangerous substances; and . . . monies and currency 
found in close proximity of a forfeitable substance.21  
 
The suspect challenged the forfeiture in federal court, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals dismissed the suit on the grounds of tribal sovereign immunity.22 Thus, in that in-
stance the Tribe imposed a civil sanction against a non-Indian offender for violating a 
public safety regulation on the reservation, and the penalty was immune from collateral 
attack in federal court. 
Such tribal enforcement efforts are not always successful. In Crowe & Dunlevy, 
P.C., v. Stidham,23 the Tenth Circuit rejected the Creek Nation’s attempt to civilly regulate 
non-Indian attorneys litigating a tribal election dispute in tribal court. A dispute arose over 
attorney fees the prevailing party in a tribal election paid, out of the tribal treasury, to 
defend the election results.24 The Creek Nation Supreme Court ordered the prevailing 
party’s attorneys—who were members of the tribal bar association and, as such, had con-
sented to be bound by the Tribe’s rules of professional conduct—to repay the fees pending 
resolution of the dispute.25 The lawyers resisted, seeking an injunction in federal court to 
prohibit the Tribe from enforcing the order.26 The federal district court issued the injunc-
tion, which was upheld on appeal. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned the Tribe 
lacked civil jurisdiction over the firm, and tribal sovereign immunity did not protect the 
Tribe against a federal injunction barring prospective enforcement of an order that ex-
ceeded the Tribe’s civil jurisdiction.27 
It is important to note that in neither the Yellow Hummer Case nor Crowe & Dunlevy 
did the Court of Appeals acknowledge that the Tribe had acted within its power in enforc-
ing its laws against non-Indians. The different outcome results from the fact that in the 
Yellow Hummer Case the Tribe seized the disputed property before the respondent was 
able to go to federal court and challenge the tribal authority.28 But tribal governments 
                                                 
 18. Yellow Hummer Case, S.C. 05-01, 4 Mvs. L. Rep. at 259; see also 22 MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION CODE 
ANN. § 2.101(9).  
 19. Yellow Hummer Case, S.C. 05-01, 4 Mvs. L. Rep at 253; see also 22 MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION CODE 
ANN. § 2-102. 
 20. Yellow Hummer Case, S.C. 05-01, 4 Mvs. L. Rep at 253.  
 21. Id. at 264.  
 22. See Miner Electric Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 23. Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C., v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 24. Id. at 1145-46. 
 25. Id.; see also In re Adoption of American Bar Association Rules of Professional Conduct, Muscogee 
(Creek) Nation Supreme Court Order (Nov. 13, 2007) (on file with the Tulsa Law Review). 
 26. Crowe, 640 F.3d at 1146.  
 27. Id. at 1153, 1156. 
 28. Miner Electric Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 1008-09 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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should have more effective, and more consistent, means to enforce their laws at their dis-
posal. 
II. TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-MEMBERS 
The current problem of Tribes’ being unable to enforce their laws against non-Indi-
ans is directly traceable to federal law, and specifically to key decisions from the United 
States Supreme Court starting in 1978.29 This paper does not attempt to critique recent 
trends in Indian law jurisprudence,30 but instead develops a practical solution to enable 
Tribes to exercise the legitimate powers of government over persons and activities within 
their borders. 
With respect to criminal jurisdiction, the rule is simple—absent congressional ac-
tion, Tribes have no authority to prosecute non-Indians in Indian Country.31 For this rea-
son, Tribes plagued by crimes committed by non-Indians must rely on (frequently inade-
quate) federal and state law enforcement efforts32 or adopt alternative means of enforcing 
the Tribes’ laws against non-Indians. 
In the realm of civil regulation and adjudication, the rules are less clear. The “path-
marking” case is Montana v. United States.33 The issue in Montana was whether the Tribe 
had authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on lands owned in fee simple by 
non-Indians within the boundaries of the Tribe’s reservation.34 The Supreme Court “read-
ily agree[d]” the Tribe could “prohibit non-members from hunting or fishing on lands be-
longing to the tribe or held by the United States in trust for the tribe . . . [and] condition 
their entry by charging a fee or establishing bag and creel limits.”35 Thus, the Court recog-
nized that Tribes retained substantial authority to regulate the conduct of non-Indians on 
lands owned or controlled by the Tribe or federal government. 
The Tribe’s attempt to regulate non-member hunting and fishing on fee lands was a 
different matter. The Court decided the alienation of reservation lands to non-Indians nec-
essarily limited the Tribe’s regulatory authority over those lands.36 The Court declared, the 
                                                 
 29. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978) (deciding for the first time that Indian 
Tribes have no criminal jurisdiction with respect to non-Indians). See also Los Coyote Band of Cahuilla & Cu-
peno Indians v. Jewell, 729 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (one factor contributing to the law and order crisis 
in Indian Country is that “the jurisdictional lines between tribal, state, and federal agencies are confusing and 
unhelpful”); INDIAN LAW AND ORDER COMMISSION, supra note 6, at v (“Ironically, the U.S. government, which 
has a trust responsibility for Indian Tribes, is fundamentally at fault for th[e] public safety gap” in Indian Coun-
try.). 
 30. This has thoroughly been covered in existing scholarship. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law 
for Our Age of Colonialism, 109 YALE L J. 1 (1999); Judith V. Royster, Oliphant and its Discontents, 13 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59 (2003). 
 31. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194-95; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 209 (2004) (affirming 
Congress’s power to authorize Indian Tribes to exercise inherent criminal authority over Indians who are not 
members of the prosecuting Tribe). Congress has recently, for the first time since Oliphant, recognized tribal 
jurisdiction over a limited class of non-Indian domestic abusers of Indian women. See Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 904).  
 32. INDIAN LAW AND ORDER COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 3-17. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 
11, at 41-52; see also Dreveskracht, supra note 7, at 9 n.38 (citing sources). 
 33. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); see Strate v. A1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997). 
 34. Cases following Montana generally refer to lands owned in fee by non-Indians, including state or local 
governments, as “fee lands” and lands owned by Tribes, individual Indians, or held in trust by the federal gov-
ernment for the benefit of the Tribe or individual Indians, as “Indian lands.” See, e.g., Strate, 520 U.S. at 446; 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001). This paper follows this convention. 
 35. Montana, 450 U.S. at 577. 
 36. Id. Prior to this case, a non-Indian’s purchase of land on an Indian reservation did not necessarily diminish 
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“[e]xercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or 
control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of tribes and so cannot 
survive without express delegation.”37 The court recognized certain circumstances under 
which a Tribe might exercise civil jurisdiction over non-members: 
 
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise 
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, 
even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, 
licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter con-
sensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial 
dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements [(the Montana I ex-
ception)]. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil au-
thority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reserva-
tion when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe [(the 
Montana II exception)].38 
 
Post-Montana case law demonstrates these areas of retained tribal sovereignty—the two 
Montana exceptions—are narrowly construed.39 The remainder of this section discusses 
various issues relevant to exercises of tribal civil enforcement jurisdiction under the two 
Montana exceptions. 
A. Indian Lands or Fee Lands 
In Montana, a crucial consideration for the Court was that the Tribe’s attempted 
regulation governed the conduct of non-Indians on lands within the Tribe’s territorial ju-
risdiction to which non-Indians held title. Essentially, the Court decided it would be ineq-
uitable to subject non-Indian purchasers of reservation lands to the jurisdiction of the 
Tribe. The Court reasoned those purchasers (or their predecessors) never expected they 
would be subject to perpetual tribal authority.40 
Hence the Court’s recognition in Montana that the Tribe could regulate hunting and 
fishing “on lands belonging to the tribe or held by the United States in trust for the tribe.”41 
Such regulations do not undermine any rational expectation held by those early non-Indian 
settlers—they had every reason to suspect the Tribe would continue to exercise govern-
mental power over the Tribe’s communal property at the very least.42 The federal courts, 
                                                 
the Tribe’s ability to exercise regulatory authority over that individual or his property. See Powers of Indian 
Tribes, 55 I.D. 14 (1935) (recognizing Indian Tribes have the power “[t]o levy dues, fees, or taxes upon the 
members of the tribe and upon nonmembers, residing or doing any business of any sort within the reservation, 
so far as may be consistent with the power of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs over licensed traders”). 
 37. Montana, 450 U.S. at 577. 
 38. Id. at 565-66. 
 39. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 357-66; Strate, 520 U.S. at 456-59. 
 40. But see Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 953-54 (8th Cir. 1905) (finding non-Indian purchasers of township 
lots within the allotted Creek Nation reservation understood they would be subject to tribal taxing and regulatory 
authority). The Court has shown far less concern for the expectations of Indian Tribes, many of which ceded vast 
tracts of land to the United States in exchange for the promise of reservations within which they were to have a 
permanent right of autonomous self-rule. See, e.g., Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1, 70-72 (1995). 
 41. Montana, 450 U.S. at 557. 
 42. See, e.g., Buster, 135 F. at 951 (holding tribal authority “to fix the terms upon which noncitizens [of the 
7
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however, have not necessarily followed this seemingly obvious proposition. 
The Supreme Court first muddied the water in 1997, with Strate v. A1 Contractors.43 
In Strate, a non-Indian woman (whose late husband and children were members of the 
Tribe) was driving on a highway when her vehicle collided with a construction truck 
owned and operated by non-Indians.44 The highway was situated on a right-of-way in favor 
of the state and was maintained by the state, but title to the underlying property was held 
in trust by the federal government in favor of the Tribe.45 Therefore, the state, and by 
extension non-Indian motorists, had an unqualified right to travel over the road.46 The 
question was whether the tribal court had jurisdiction to hear the motorist’s negligence 
action against the truck driver and his employer.47 
The Supreme Court applied the Montana test.48 As in Montana, the court “readily 
agree[d] . . . that tribes retain considerable control over nonmember conduct on tribal 
lands.”49 In Strate, though, the Court held the right-of-way to be “equivalent, for nonmem-
ber governance purposes, to alienated, non Indian land.”50 Thus, because the Tribe could 
not “assert a landowner’s right to occupy and exclude” non-Indian motorists from the right 
of way, the Montana rule was applicable.51 
The Supreme Court has weighed in on this issue just one other time. In Nevada v. 
Hicks,52 the controversy involved a trespass and tort action that arose “on tribe-owned land 
within the reservation.”53 The wrinkle in that case was that the non-Indian defendants were 
the state of Nevada and state game wardens who were “executing a search warrant for 
evidence of an off-reservation crime.”54 The Court ultimately decided, notwithstanding the 
Tribe’s ownership interest in the land, that “tribal authority to regulate state officers in 
executing process related to the violation, off-reservation, of state laws is not essential to 
tribal self-government or internal relations.”55 The Court created out of whole cloth a lim-
itation on tribal jurisdiction based on the defendant’s status as a state law enforcement 
officer.56 
The Hicks majority’s discussion of the issue created much uncertainty regarding the 
scope of tribal jurisdiction and the reach of the Montana rule. After suggestion in broad 
terms that “the rule of Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian land,” the Court 
explained that “the ownership status of land . . . is [a] factor to consider in determining 
                                                 
Tribe] might conduct business within [the Tribe’s] territorial boundaries . . . remained undisturbed” by federal 
law). 
 43. Strate, 520 U.S. at 438. 
 44. Id. at 442-43. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 454-56. 
 47. Id. at 444-45. 
 48. Strate, 520 U.S. at 453, 456. 
 49. Id. at 454. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 456. 
 52. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).   
 53. Id. at 357. 
 54. Id. at 356-57. 
 55. Id. at 364. 
 56. Id. at 364-66. 
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whether regulation of the activities of non-members is necessary to protect tribal self-gov-
ernment or to control internal relations.”57 The Court then cryptically stated ownership 
status “may sometimes be a dispositive factor,” noting that, in the Court’s decisions to 
date, “the absence of tribal ownership has been virtually conclusive of the absence of tribal 
civil jurisdiction.”58 Thus, turning Montana on its head,59 the Court suggested in Hicks that 
Tribes are almost conclusively presumed not to have jurisdiction over non-Indian activities 
on fee lands, and the Montana rule and its exceptions apply on tribal lands on the reserva-
tion. 
The concurring opinions in Hicks demonstrate the scope of the confusion. In her 
partial concurrence, Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, suggested 
the majority opinion “finally resolve[d] that Montana . . . governs a tribe’s civil jurisdiction 
over nonmembers, regardless of land ownership.”60 However, this concurrence also criti-
cized the majority opinion for failing to give “due consideration to land status, which has 
always featured prominently in [the Court’s] analysis of tribal jurisdiction,”61 and for is-
suing a “sweeping opinion, [which] without cause undermine[d] the authority of tribes to 
‘make their own laws and be ruled by them.’”62 
Like Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, Justice Souter’s concurrence, joined by Jus-
tices Kennedy and Thomas, suggested that the Montana rule applies on fee and tribal land 
alike.63 However, Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence suggested the Hicks decision has no 
bearing on the broader issue of Montana’s applicability over tribal lands because the 
Tribe’s attempt to regulate a state officer’s conduct presented special circumstance—a 
state official’s execution of a warrant relating to an off-reservation offense—which would 
not be implicated in the typical case.64 
The lower federal courts have reached varying conclusions regarding the effect of 
Hicks on the fee land/Indian land distinction. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has ex-
pressly held that Hicks extended the Montana analysis to all reservation lands, regardless 
of ownership.65 The Eighth Circuit follows the Tenth Circuit.66 The Ninth Circuit has 
adopted a far narrower interpretation of Hicks. In Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area 
v. LaRance, the court concluded, “where there are no sufficient competing state interests 
at play, . . . the tribe has regulatory jurisdiction through its inherent authority to exclude, 
independent from the power recognized in Montana.”67 
                                                 
 57. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359-60. 
 58. Id. at 360. At the same time, Hicks seems to recognize tribal ownership of the relevant lands may some-
times be the dispositive consideration supporting tribal jurisdiction over non-members. Id. at 370-71. Hicks pro-
vides no guidance concerning when land ownership is dispositive and when it is merely a factor. 
 59. Recall that as recently as 1997 the Supreme Court “readily agreed” with its recognition in Montana that 
“tribes retain considerable control over nonmember conduct on tribal lands.” Strate v. A1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 
438, 454 (1997) (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981)). 
 60. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 387 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 61. Id. at 395. 
 62. Id. (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 459). 
 63. Id. at 375-76 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 65. Macarthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057, 1069 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C., 
v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1151 (10th Cir. 2011) (applying Montana analysis to controversy arising out of tribal 
judicial proceedings presumptively taking place on tribal or trust lands). 
 66. Attorney’s Process and Investigation Servs., Inc., v. Sac and Fox Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 
927, 936 (8th Cir. 2010).  
 67. Water Wheel Camp Recreation Area v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2011); see also McDonald 
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It is thus unclear the extent to which Hicks limits the Tribes’ authority over non-
Indians on tribal lands. What is clear is that under current law, Tribes asserting jurisdiction 
over non-Indians on the reservation might be required to justify their actions under the 
Montana rule, even when regulating conduct on tribal lands or trust lands. Tribes must, 
therefore, consider Montana when drafting civil enforcement codes, even where applying 
the code on tribal or trust lands.68 
B. The First Montana Exception: Consensual Relations 
Even if the Montana rule applies, Tribes retain some authority to regulate non-mem-
bers within the Tribe’s territorial jurisdiction. The Montana Court recognized two circum-
stances in which the Montana rule does not preclude tribal authority over non-members.69 
The first exception applies where the non-Indian enters into consensual relations with the 
Tribe or its members.70 Cases following Montana have shown this to be a narrow excep-
tion, and parties advancing tribal jurisdiction under a consensual relationship theory have 
a heavy burden to establish the parties to the litigation entered into the type of relationship 
necessary to satisfy this test. 
In Strate v. A1 Contractors, the Court considered whether a construction company’s 
contract to perform work for the Tribe created a sufficient consensual relationship to sup-
port the tribal court’s jurisdiction over a negligence claim brought by a non-Indian motor-
ist, Gisela Fredericks, against the company and its employee regarding a traffic accident 
between Mrs. Fredericks and the employee operating a company vehicle.71 The Court an-
swered in the negative, reasoning the relationship identified by Mrs. Fredericks—that be-
tween the Tribe and the company regarding a construction activity—was not sufficiently 
related to the cause of action, the automobile accident.72 As the Court put it, Mrs. Freder-
icks “was not a party to” the contract between the company and the Tribe, “and the tribes 
were strangers to the accident” between Mrs. Fredericks and the company driver.73 
The Strate Court indicated that the presumptive scope of the consensual relationship 
exception is demonstrated by the precedents upon which Montana relied. The Court’s pre-
cise wording bears repeating: 
 
Montana’s list of cases fitting within the first exception, see 450 U. S., 
at 565-566, indicates the type of activities the Court had in mind: Wil-
liams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (declaring tribal jurisdiction ex-
clusive over lawsuit arising out of on reservation sales transaction be-
tween nonmember plaintiff and member defendants); Morris v. 
Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904) (upholding tribal permit tax on non-
member owned livestock within boundaries of the Chickasaw Nation); 
                                                 
v. Means, 309 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing “Hicks makes no claim that it modifies or overrules 
Montana”). 
 68. This is not to say tribal advocates should concede that the Montana limitations apply to tribal regulatory 
efforts on tribal lands. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Water Wheel demonstrates federal courts might recognize 
a Tribe’s inherent authority to regulate non-members on tribal lands, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s ag-
gressive application of Montana. Tribal civil enforcement codes should take advantage of this possibility. 
 69. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Strate v. A1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1997). 
 72. Id. at 456-57. 
 73. Id. at 457. 
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Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (CA8 1905) (upholding Tribe’s permit 
tax on nonmembers for the privilege of conducting business within 
Tribe’s borders; court characterized as “inherent” the Tribe’s “author-
ity . . . to prescribe the terms upon which noncitizens may transact busi-
ness within its borders”); Colville, 447 U.S., at 152-154 (tribal authority 
to tax on-reservation cigarette sales to nonmembers “is a fundamental 
attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by 
federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status”).74 
 
The Court offered no further explanation regarding the limitations these precedents impose 
on the consensual relationship exception,75 and it is far from clear why the Court believed 
these precedents so clearly precluded Mrs. Fredericks’ lawsuit. Regardless, the various 
circumstances invoked by the Montana Court, and emphasized in Strate, seem to suggest 
the Tribe can exercise jurisdiction over broad categories of economic activity occurring 
within the Tribe’s territory. Significantly, a sufficient relationship arises when a non-In-
dian partakes of “the privilege of conducting business within [a] tribe’s borders,” owing 
to the Tribe’s “inherent . . . authority . . . to prescribe the terms upon which noncitizens 
may transact business within its borders.”76 Subsequent applications, however, suggest the 
Court’s conception of the Tribes’ inherent authority may be more limited. 
In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,77 the Court considered whether the Navajo Na-
tion had authority to impose an occupancy tax on guests staying at a hotel owned by a non-
member on fee land.78 After determining the Montana analysis governed the issue,79 the 
Court declared there was not a sufficient consensual relationship between the hotel occu-
pants and the Tribe.80 
The Tribe argued the Tribe’s provision of emergency services to the hotel and its 
guests justified the imposition of the tax, but the Court rejected this argument.81 Clarifying 
the nature of the exception, the Court noted “[t]he consensual relationship must stem from 
‘commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,’ and a nonmember’s actual 
or potential receipt of tribal police, fire, and medical services does not create the requisite 
connection.”82 The Court stated that the Tribe’s argument “ignore[d] the dependent status 
of Indian tribes and subvert[ed] territorial restriction upon tribal power.”83 The Court fur-
ther clarified that “Montana’s consensual relationship exception requires that the tax or 
                                                 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457. 
 77. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
 78. Id. at 647-48. 
 79. Id. at 654. Prior to Atkinson Trading Co., it was widely understood that Tribes had inherent power to tax 
non-members on the reservation, powers that were not limited by the Montana rule. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982) (“we conclude that the tribe has the authority to impose a . . . tax on the 
[economic] activities of [non-members doing business on the reservation] as part of its power to govern and to 
pay for self-government”); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-
54 (1980) (upholding imposition of a tribal cigarette sales tax and recognizing “[t]he widely held understanding 
within the Federal Government has always been that federal law to date has not worked a divestiture of Indian 
taxing power”); see also Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 951 (8th Cir. 1905) (recognizing the Tribe had the power 
to impose a business tax on non-members doing business on fee lands on the allotted reservation). 
 80. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 654-57. 
 81. Id. at 654-56. 
 82. Id. at 655.   
 83. Id. 
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regulation imposed by the Indian tribe have a nexus to the consensual relationship it-
self. . . . A nonmember’s consensual relationship in one area thus does not trigger tribal 
civil authority in another—it is not ‘in for a penny, in for a Pound.’”84 
With Atkinson, the Court retreated from its position in Strate that Tribes retained 
“inherent . . . authority . . . to prescribe the terms upon which noncitizens may transact 
business within [their] borders,” including the power to “tax . . . nonmembers for the priv-
ilege of conducting business” on the Tribe’s reservation.85 It is beyond dispute that both 
the hotelier and his guests were “transact[ing] business” on the Navajo reservation, but 
this was not sufficient to support the Tribe’s jurisdiction over the non-member hotel guests. 
Strate and Atkinson demonstrate the consensual relationship exception is not easily 
met. At the very least, there must be a nexus between the consensual relationship and the 
regulation or controversy at issue—an unrelated relationship between the Tribe, or Tribe-
members, and the dispute or the subject of the regulation does not suffice.86 There must 
also be the proper sort of relationship. The “generalized availability of tribal services” is 
also insufficient.87 A sufficient relationship can arise where a non-member avails himself 
of the “privilege of conducting business” on the reservation,88 but sometimes this relation-
ship is not enough.89 Due to these limitations and uncertainties, Tribes seeking to utilize 
the consensual relationship exception to support a civil regulatory enforcement code must 
carefully craft the code provisions to take maximum advantage of the consensual relation-
ships that suffice to support the Tribe’s jurisdiction on collateral federal review.90 
C. The Second Montana Exception: Political Integrity, Economic Security, or Health 
or Welfare 
The second Montana exception permits Tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-
members where the non-member’s conduct “threatens or has some direct effect on the 
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”91 The Mon-
tana Court provided no useful guidance on the application of this exception; subsequent 
                                                 
 84. Id. at 656. 
 85. Strate v. A1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457 (1997). 
 86. See McArthur v. San Juan Cnty., 309 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir. 2002) (emphasizing the Montana I 
exception requires a sufficient “nexus between the consensual relationship and the exertion of tribal authority”); 
see also Crowe & Dunlevy v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011) (deciding that attorneys’ membership in 
a tribal bar association and decision to represent a tribal official in an election dispute in tribal court was not 
sufficient to allow the tribal court sua sponte to review the payment of attorney fees, where there was no actual 
dispute between the law firm and the tribal client). 
 87. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 655. 
 88. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457. 
 89. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 655-57. 
 90. Some authorities have suggested that a consensual relationship alone is not sufficient to support tribal 
jurisdiction, reasoning that there must be an independent showing that such tribal jurisdiction is “‘necessary to 
protect tribal self-government and internal relations.’” Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 
F.3d 167, 177 (5th Cir. 2014) (Smith, Circuit Justice, dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 27040006 
(U.S. June 12, 2014) (No. 13-1496). However, to date, “no court has, despite finding a consensual relationship 
with a nexus to a tribal regulation, rejected tribal jurisdiction because the relationship did not ‘implicate tribal 
governance and internal relations.’” Id. at 175. And with good reason—this suggested limitation would “read the 
first Montana exception out of existence” because “[i]f regulation of some consensual relationship is necessary 
to protect tribal self-government or control internal relations, it would seem to fall necessarily within the second 
Montana exception.” Id. at 175 n.6. However, as of the publication of this article, a petition for certiorari has 
been filed in the Dolgencorp case, and it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will agree to review the 
question.  
 91. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).  
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courts were left to guess as to what sort of conduct would sufficiently impact tribal self-
governance to justify tribal regulation of non-members. The Supreme Court has, thus far, 
construed the exception quite narrowly. 
Take the Strate case. As previously discussed, Strate involved a tort claim between 
non-members arising out of an automobile accident on a state road running through the 
reservation.92 The Court admitted—it hardly could have denied—that, “those who drive 
carelessly on a public highway running through a reservation endanger all in the vicinity, 
and surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members.”93 But, the Court cautioned, the second 
Montana exception is not to be read too broadly.94  The Court instructed: 
 
Key to its proper application is the [Montana] Court’s preface: Indian 
tribes retain their inherent power [to punish tribal offenders,] to deter-
mine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, 
and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members. . . . But [a tribe’s in-
herent power does not reach] beyond what is necessary to protect tribal 
self-government or to control internal relations.95 
 
In short, tribal civil jurisdiction under Montana II is limited to that “needed to preserve 
‘the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.’”96 Regu-
lating a simple automobile tort between non-members on a state highway on the reserva-
tion was not sufficient to meet this test.97 For whatever reason, conduct the Court admitted 
was a public safety hazard, endangering life, health, and property on the reservation, did 
not sufficiently impact the “economic security, political integrity, or the health or welfare 
of the tribe” to justify allowing the Tribe to regulate a non-member’s tortious conduct on 
the reservation. 
The next significant application came in 2001, with the twin cases of Atkinson Trad-
ing Co. v. Shirley,98 and Nevada v. Hicks.99 In Shirley, the Navajo Nation attempted to 
impose a hotel occupancy tax on a non-Indian hotelier operating on fee land within the 
Tribe’s reservation. Without further analysis, the Court dismissed the notion that the Mon-
tana II exception could support the tax, simply stating that “we fail to see how petitioner’s 
operation of a hotel on non-Indian fee land ‘threatens or has some direct effect on the 
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”100 
Hicks involved a highly unusual application of Montana II.101 In Hicks, a Tribe-
member plaintiff sued state game wardens for trespass and damage to property, when the 
wardens entered the plaintiff’s on-reservation home pursuant to search warrants issued by 
                                                 
 92. Strate, 520 U.S. at 442-43. 
 93. Id. at 457-58. 
 94. Id. at 458-59. 
 95. Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564) (alterations in original). 
 96. Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)). 
 97. Strate, 520 U.S at 458-59. In Nord v. Kelly, 520 F.3d 848, 856-57 (8th Cir. 2008), the Eighth Circuit 
extended the Strate holding to a vehicle tort action brought by a Tribe-member against a non-Indian. Except for 
the fact that a tribal member was the plaintiff, the facts in Nord were identical to those in Strate in all relevant 
respects. Id. 
 98. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).  
 99. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).   
 100. Shirley, 532 U.S. at 657 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).  
 101. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 353. 
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state and tribal authorities.102 Reviewing the tribal court’s jurisdiction over the suit, the 
Supreme Court decided that “tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process 
related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-govern-
ment or internal relations—to the right to make laws and be ruled by them.”103 Given the 
unique and specific factual context in which Hicks arose, it is doubtful that this case sheds 
meaningful light on the scope of the Montana II exception in other contexts.104 
Most recently, the Court in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle 
Company continued the trend of revising the Montana II exception to preclude tribal ju-
risdiction under whatever set of facts the case before it presented.105 In this case, the Court 
explained: 
 
The second exception authorizes the tribe to exercise civil jurisdiction 
when non-Indians “conduct” menaces the “political integrity, the eco-
nomic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. The conduct must 
do more than injure the tribe, it must “imperil the subsistence” of the 
tribal community. One commenter has noted that “th[e] elevated thresh-
old for application of the second Montana exception suggests that tribal 
power must be necessary to avert catastrophic consequences.”106 
 
Perhaps most troubling in these cases is the suggestion that a Tribe’s jurisdiction 
over non-Indians is limited to circumstances in which that power is strictly necessary to 
preserve the Tribes’ right to “make their own laws and be governed by them”;107 conduct 
that literally “imperils the subsistence of the tribal community.”108 This narrow view of 
tribal authority over nonmembers is contrary to Montana, wherein the court “readily 
agreed” the Tribe retained “considerable control” over the conduct of nonmembers on In-
dian lands, and could regulate non-members on fee lands where the non-member’s conduct 
had “direct effects” on the “political integrity, the economic security, or the health or wel-
fare of the tribe.”109 In any event, in spite of the Supreme Court’s sometimes overly narrow 
language, the lower federal courts have occasionally demonstrated that the Montana II 
exception is more than a dead letter, and can be a viable option to support tribal regulation 
and adjudication under the proper circumstances.110  
                                                 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 364.   
 104. See id. at 358 n.2 (“Our holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state 
officers enforcing state law. We leave open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants 
in general.”).  
 105. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2726-27 (2008). See, e.g., 
Dean Suagee, The Supreme Court’s “Whack-A-Mole” Game Theory in Federal Indian Law, 7 GREAT PLAINS 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 90, 99-106 (2002). 
 106. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2726 (internal citations omitted). 
 107. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360-61, 364; Strate v. A1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997); see also Plains 
Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2723. 
 108. Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2726. 
 109. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). 
 110. See, e.g., Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 819 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that tribal court had adjudicative jurisdiction under Montana II over a trespass claim brought by the 
Tribe against a holdover tenant, where the tenants “unlawful occupancy and use of tribal land not only deprived 
the [Tribe] of its power to govern and regulate its own land, but also of its right to manage and control an asset 
capable of producing significant income”); Attorney’s Process and Investigation Servs., Inc., v. Sac and Fox 
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D. Residual Jurisdiction: The Power to Exclude 
Even while limiting the scope of tribal authority over non-Indians within the Tribe’s 
Indian Country, the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that Tribes retain the “re-
sidual” authority to exclude undesirables from their jurisdiction, and the “ancillary” au-
thority to stop and investigate suspected lawbreakers. In Duro v. Reina, for instance, the 
Court explained: 
 
The tribes . . . possess their traditional and undisputed power to exclude 
persons whom they deem to be undesirable from tribal lands. . . . Tribal 
law enforcement authorities have the power to restrain those who disturb 
public order on the reservation, and if necessary, to eject them. Where 
jurisdiction to try and punish an offender rests outside the tribe, tribal 
officers may exercise their power to detain the offender and transport 
him to the proper authorities.111 
 
The Tribe’s power to exclude is expansive, encompassing “the lesser included, incidental 
power to regulate non-Indian use of” the lands to which the Tribe grants access.112 
It is unclear whether the tribal power to exclude extends to alienated fee lands within 
the Tribe’s jurisdiction. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that the Tribe, in leasing tribal lands to a non-Indian mineral developer, had waived 
its sovereign power to exclude or to impose conditions on the developer’s entry onto the 
Tribe’s territory.113 The Court reasoned that the Tribe, as a land owner, granted the devel-
oper certain property rights, but that this agreement in no way diminished the Tribe’s gov-
ernmental prerogative to secure its borders and exclude from the reservation those who do 
not abide by the Tribe’s conditions for entry.114 
In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, a case in which a 
fractured Court limited the power of Tribes to pass zoning laws applicable to nonmember 
landowners in the Tribe’s territory,115 a plurality of the Court suggested the Tribe “no 
longer ha[d] the power to exclude fee owners from its land within the boundaries of the 
reservation,” because the tribal exclusion power “was necessarily overcome by . . . an 
‘implici[t] grant’ of access to the land.”116 The Court speculated that, by permitting non-
Indians to own property and settle within the Tribe’s territory, the resulting confusion 
caused by fractured and inconsistent regulatory authority was all part of Congress’s 
plan.117 However, the Court made no further attempt to explain its apparent departure from 
                                                 
Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 939 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that tribal court had adjudicative jurisdic-
tion under Montana II over claims brought by Tribe against non-Indian private security contractors who staged 
an armed raid on the seat of tribal government with the intent to “seize control of the tribal government and 
economy by force”). 
 111. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696-97 (1990) (emphasis added). 
 112. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 US 679, 688 (1993); see Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 
144-48 (1982). 
 113. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 144-48. 
 114. Id.   
 115. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 430-31, 444-47 (1989). 
 116. Id. at 424 (internal marks and alterations omitted). 
 117. Id. at 435-37. 
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Merrion’s recognition that the Tribes’ power to exclude is an inherent aspect of sover-
eignty, not simply an expression of Tribes exercising “a landowner’s right to occupy and 
exclude.”118 
Two years after Brendale, the Court in Duro v. Reina reaffirmed the Tribe’s power 
to “exclude persons whom they deem to be undesirable from tribal lands.”119 The Duro 
Court did not clarify whether this power extends to excluding non-Indian owners of reser-
vation fee land. In fact, the Court’s use of the phrase “tribal lands” might indicate the Court 
was simply referring to the Tribe’s right as a landowner to occupy and exclude. But context 
matters. This passage in Duro responded to the (indisputably true)120 argument that the 
Court’s aggressive limitations on tribal criminal jurisdiction had created a law and order 
crisis in Indian Country.121 While the opinion made clear that the Court was not moved by 
such concerns,122 the Court suggested the Tribe’s power to exclude could serve as a sub-
stitute for criminal law enforcement jurisdiction.123 This exclusion power would be a poor 
substitute indeed if the Tribe could not use it against those who in many instances would 
present the greatest threat—lawbreakers who actually own property and live on the Res-
ervation. 
Just three years later, however, the Court endorsed the Brendale plurality’s position, 
remarking: 
 
Montana and Brendale establish that when an Indian tribe conveys own-
ership of its tribal lands to non-Indians, it loses any former right of ab-
solute and exclusive use and occupation of the conveyed lands. . . . [This 
conveyance] eliminated the Tribe’s power to exclude non-Indians from 
these lands, and with that the incidental regulatory jurisdiction formerly 
enjoyed by the Tribe.124 
 
Thus, the Court has suggested the Tribe’s “traditional and undisputed power to exclude”125 
is limited where non-Indian fee owners had a property interest within the Tribe’s jurisdic-
tion. 
Four year after Bourland, the Court in Strate changed course yet again, unanimously 
endorsing a more expansive reading of the tribal exclusion power.126 The Strate Court af-
firmed that Tribes have the power to “detain and turn over to state officials nonmembers 
stopped on the [state] highway for conduct violating state law.”127 This was so even though 
the highway was situated on a right-of-way favoring the state, the “equivalent, for non-
member governance purposes, to alienated, non Indian land.”128 Thus, while the Supreme 
                                                 
 118. Strate v. A1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 (1997); see Merrion, 455 U.S. at 144-48. 
 119. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696 (1990).  
 120. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. 
 121. Duro, 495 U.S. at 696. 
 122. Id. at 698. 
 123. Id. at 696-97. 
 124. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689 (1993).   
 125. Duro, 495 U.S. at 696-97. 
 126. Strate v. A1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 n.11 (1997). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 454. 
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Court has consistently described this power as “traditional and undisputed,” it has strug-
gled for decades to define the nature and scope of this power, and to reconcile the power 
with the constraints the Court continues to place on tribal authority more generally.  
However, the Court has confirmed that the tribal exclusion power (whatever its reach 
may be) does include the lesser power “to set conditions on entry to that land.”129 The 
Court in Plains Commerce Bank recognized that the conditional entry power can support 
“licensing requirements and hunting regulations” and taxation.130 In fact, that Court 
broadly recognized “[r]egulatory authority goes hand in hand with the power to ex-
clude.”131 Plains Commerce somewhat inconsistently suggested Indian Tribes may “ex-
clude outsiders from entering tribal land[, but] do not, as a general matter, possess author-
ity over non-Indians who come within their borders.”132 But this isolated passage, 
presented without analysis or explanation, can hardly be thought to undermine the Court’s 
express recognition that the power to exclude encompasses the related power to regulate 
those who are granted conditional permission to enter onto tribal lands. 
One federal court of appeals decision has analyzed the scope of the Tribe’s exclusion 
power, and the associated authority to regulate non-members who enter onto tribal lands, 
in great depth. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Water Wheel Camp Recreation Area 
v. LaRance, recognized an Indian Tribe’s authority to regulate and adjudicate a dispute 
involving a non-Indian closely held corporation and business owner (collectively, “Water 
Wheel”) charged with unlawful detainer, breach of a lease of tribal lands, and trespass onto 
tribal lands.133 Responding to Water Wheel’s argument that the Hicks case required the 
court to apply the Montana analysis, the court held that, unless special circumstances like 
those in Hicks were implicated, “the tribe’s status as landowner [was] enough to support 
regulatory jurisdiction without considering Montana.”134 
The Supreme Court, then, has not adopted a consistent position regarding the scope 
of the tribal power to exclude, but seems to reverse its position with each new case. What 
is clear is that Indian Tribes retain a sovereign power to exclude;135 this power encom-
passes the “lesser power” to impose certain restrictions and regulations on those to whom 
the tribe permits entry;136 this power is separate from, and broader than, “a landowner’s 
right to occupy and exclude”;137 but this power is somewhat limited with respect to lands 
over which the Tribe’s rights as landowner have been limited or extinguished.138 How 
those principles will be applied in future cases is purely a guessing game. 
III. DOCTRINES OF LEGISLATIVE DEFERENCE 
This article’s proposed statutory approach to tribal civil regulatory authority relies 
                                                 
 129. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2723 (2008). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 691 n.11 (1993)). 
 132. Id. at 2719-20.   
 133. Water Wheel Camp Recreation Area v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 804-05 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 134. Id. at 814. 
 135. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696 (1990).  
 136. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 423-24 (1989); see also 
Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S. Ct. at 2721. 
 137. Strate v. A1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 (1997); see, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 
130, 144-48 (1982). 
 138. Compare South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689 (1993), with Strate, 520 U.S. at 456 n.11. 
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on two doctrines of legislative deference, each of which has been consistently and zeal-
ously applied by the United States Supreme Court in non-Indian-law contexts. Following 
well-established precedent, the Court should afford deference to the clearly expressed in-
tent and factual findings of the tribal legislatures adopting the proposed civil enforcement 
codes. As will be explained below, careful drafting of tribal enforcement codes, supported 
by the Supreme Court’s own rules for legislative deference, should greatly enhance the 
case for recognizing tribal civil jurisdiction to enforce the tribal civil regulatory code 
against non-Indian offenders. 
A. The Civil/Criminal Distinction 
Because Tribes have no authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-mem-
bers, but limited civil authority to regulate and adjudicate disputes involving non-mem-
bers, the dispositive threshold question is whether the tribal enforcement action is a civil 
regulatory sanction or a criminal punishment. The federal courts have not, it appears, ad-
dressed this question directly.139 In principal, however, tribal governments should be able 
to use civil means, governed by carefully drafted tribal codes, to regulate the conduct of 
non-members, consistent with the limitations on tribal jurisdiction imposed by the federal 
courts. 
The Supreme Court has addressed the civil/criminal distinction as it is applies to 
federal constitutional rights.140 Under the federal test, whether a penalty is civil or criminal 
“is, at least initially, a matter of statutory construction.”141 If the legislature creating the 
remedy plainly intended that it be a civil matter, the legislative intent is given great defer-
ence.142 The Court will reject the legislature’s manifest intent only where the party chal-
lenging the statute provides “the clearest proof” that “the statutory scheme [is] so punitive 
either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention” to deem it “civil.”143 This 
rule recognizes that “all civil penalties have some deterrent effect,”144 so the mere fact that 
a sanction is punitive is insufficient to overcome the legislature’s judgment that a remedial 
statute created a civil, rather than criminal, penalty. 
The Supreme Court applies a multi-factor test to gauge whether a putatively civil 
regulation is actually a criminal penalty in disguise. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the 
Court considered the following factors: 
 
                                                 
 139. In Miner Electric Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 503 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 2007), the court 
dismissed a non-Indian’s challenge to a tribal civil enforcement action based on the Tribe’s assertion of sovereign 
immunity. However, the court did not address the merits of the non-Indian’s challenge to the Tribe’s jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 140. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (considering whether successive civil and criminal 
penalties relating to the same conduct implicated the double jeopardy clause); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346, 360 (1997) (double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) (Fifth 
Amendment prohibition against self-incrimination, Sixth Amendment protections, and the proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt standard). 
 141. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99.  
 142. Id. at 99-100; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972) 
(suggesting a statutory penalty must be “unreasonable or excessive” before the Court will disregard Congress’ 
intent); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960). 
 143. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49). See also Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (“[O]nly 
the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil 
remedy into a criminal penalty.”).  
 144. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 102. 
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[(1)] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; 
[(2)] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; [(3)] 
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; [(4)] whether 
its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribu-
tion and deterrence; [(5)] whether the behavior to which it applies is al-
ready a crime; [(6)] whether an alternative purpose to which it may ra-
tionally be connected is assignable for it; and [(7)] whether it appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.145 
 
At first blush, tribal lawmakers could be forgiven for thinking this test could be problem-
atic, because an effective tribal civil enforcement regime will satisfy many, perhaps most, 
of these “punishment” criteria. However, the Supreme Court has demonstrated that this 
test is not onerous in the least. 
In Hudson v. United States, the Court considered a double jeopardy challenge 
brought by individuals accused of violating federal banking regulations and subjected both 
to civil penalties and criminal charges for their purported misdeeds.146 For the civil penal-
ties, the government levied substantial fines against the petitioners, and barred them from 
any future transactions with federally insured deposit banks.147 After the petitioners stipu-
lated to the civil penalties, the government brought a criminal indictment based on this 
same conduct.148 The petitioners challenged the indictment based on double jeopardy.149 
The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ challenge, holding the “civil” penalties were 
indeed civil and therefore double jeopardy was not implicated.150 
Applying the Kennedy factors, the Court found “very little showing” that the civil 
penalties were effectively criminal in nature. Applying the first factor, the Court said bar-
ring the petitioners from future participation in banking activities was not an “affirmative 
disability or restraint” because it was less severe than the “‘infamous punishment’ of im-
prisonment.”151 On the second factor, the Court found neither the debarment nor the mon-
etary penalty were “punishment” as the term is used in this context.152 Third, the Court 
noted the civil penalty did not come “into play only on a finding of scienter,” even though 
petitioners’ bad faith was a substantial factor in determining the amount of the fine and 
whether they would be subject to debarment.153 Finally, the Court acknowledged that the 
petitioners’ conduct was indeed criminal, and the penalties served substantial deterrence 
purposes.154 The Court dismissed these last factors as unimportant.155 
Thus, in a case where essentially every punishment factor indicated the purported 
“civil” sanctions were indeed wolves in sheep clothing, the Court dismissed the Kennedy 
factors out of hand, finding “very little” indication that the legislature’s “civil” designation 
was improper. Tribal lawmakers should take heart—tribal civil regulatory systems will not 
                                                 
 145. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). 
 146. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 95-96. 
 147. Id. at 96-97. 
 148. Id. at 97-98. 
 149. Id. at 98. 
 150. Id. at 105. 
 151. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104. 
 152. Id. at 104. 
 153. Id. at 104-05. 
 154. Id. at 105.  
 155. Id.   
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be deemed criminal, and will not run afoul of Oliphant’s bright-line rule, if the Court ap-
plies its established Hudson/Kennedy approach to distinguish civil from criminal sanc-
tions.156 
The federal courts have not confirmed the Hudson/Kennedy rule applies in the con-
text of tribal jurisdiction. There are good reasons to assume this rule, however. The Su-
preme Court has drawn a sharp line between a Tribe’s criminal and civil jurisdiction as 
they relate to non-Indians.157 These limitations are creatures of federal law, devised by the 
Supreme Court and reflecting the Court’s judgment as to the restrictions congressional 
policy implicitly placed on tribal jurisdiction.158 If the distinction between tribal civil and 
criminal authority, as reflected in the Montana and Oliphant decisions, has any meaning 
at all, that meaning must come from federal law. And the Hudson/Kennedy analysis is 
sufficient, in the Court’s view, to preserve constitutional rights implicated by criminal 
prosecutions. It has never been suggested that protecting non-Indians from tribal regula-
tion requires a more stringent analysis than that used to protect the constitutional rights of 
criminal defendants. Thus, there is every reason to believe Tribes have an inherent power 
to, consistent with the Montana limitations, exercise civil regulatory authority over non-
Indians on the Tribe’s reservation, and that these civil regulations will be recognized as 
such by federal courts, provided the regulations at issue meet the Supreme Court’s fairly 
relaxed standard for classifying penalties as ‘civil.’ 
B. Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-finding 
The Supreme Court has also given great deference to explicit and implicit legislative 
findings of fact when evaluating whether a statute or executive action is lawful.159 The 
Court has cited two principal justifications for this deference. First, Courts properly defer 
to legislative fact-finding because legislatures have an institutional advantage over courts 
in making factual judgments regarding “legislative” facts with broad-ranging policy im-
plications.160 Second, the Court defers to legislatures out of “respect for [their] authority 
                                                 
 156. See also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 
(1960); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 (1938); but see Dep’t of Rev. of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 
U.S. 767, 783 (1994) (invalidating a state tax on possession of illegal narcotics, finding the tax to be “too far 
removed in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to escape characterization as punishment for the 
purpose of Double Jeopardy analysis.”). Justice Scalia’s dissent in Kurth Ranch emphasized that the Double 
Jeopardy question in that case, whether the state’s tax constituted multiple punishments for the same conduct, 
was fundamentally different from the question in Kennedy, whether the legislature’s characterization of a penalty 
as “civil” was constitutionally permissible. See id. at 805-07. 
 157. Compare Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981), with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978). 
 158. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66 (“Oliphant only determined inherent authority in criminal matters[;] . . 
. Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.”).  
The Court recognized the Oliphant prohibition on criminal jurisdiction drastically limited the Tribe’s ability to 
enforce even civil regulations against non-Indians. See id. at 565 n.14. However, the Court has had no opportunity 
to consider the criminal/civil distinction in the Indian law context. 
 159. See, e.g., Turner Broad. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 195-96 (1997); Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 
547, 569 (1990); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981). 
 160. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 569 (with respect to “‘complex’ empirical question[s],” the 
Court “must pay close attention to the . . . fact finding of Congress and “give ‘great weight to the decisions of 
Congress’”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (legislatures possess greater competency to “weigh 
and ‘evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of 
approach that is not available to the courts.’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976))); Walters v. 
Nat’l Ass’n. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U. S. 305, 331 n.12 (1985) (recognizing “[w]hen Congress makes find-
ings on essentially factual issues . . . those findings are . . . entitled to a great deal of deference); United States v. 
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to exercise the legislative power,”161 particularly with regard to matters that are specially 
entrusted to the legislative office.162 
In Turner v. Federal Communications Commission, the Court recognized that Con-
gress “is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of 
data bearing upon legislative questions.”163 This judicial deference to Congress’s institu-
tional advantage is well established in the Court’s precedents. The Court has consistently 
recognized legislatures have an institutional advantage over courts to decide “complex 
empirical questions,”164 make “predictive judgments,”165 and “weigh and ‘evaluate the re-
sults of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of 
approach that is not available to the courts.’”166 In contrast, courts are particularly ill-suited 
to make such determinations.167 
Wholly apart from the Court’s view of Congress’s institutional advantage in reach-
ing factual conclusions bearing on public policy, the Court has recognized that deference 
is required out of separation-of-powers concerns. Turner recognized that the Court owed 
Congress deference “out of respect for its authority to exercise the legislative power . . . 
lest [the Court] infringe on traditional legislative authority to make predictive judgments 
when enacting nationwide regulatory policy.”168 This deference is particularly strong when 
the subject matter of the legislation is particularly within the legislative purview. In Ros-
tker v. Goldberg, for example, the Court deferred to Congress’s judgment that men, but 
not women, should register for the selective service, because the Constitution specifically 
vested Congress with the authority to regulate the armed forces.169 The Court noted that, 
“[b]ecause of Congress’s constitutional role in regulating military affairs, [courts] must be 
particularly careful not to substitute [their] judgment of what is desirable for that of Con-
gress, or [their] own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative 
Branch.”170 
Both of these rationales strongly favor the federal and state courts deferring to tribal 
legislatures to determine legislative facts bearing on the necessity of enforcing civil regu-
latory laws against non-Indians on the reservations. First, federal and state courts are par-
ticularly ill-equipped to decide “complex empirical questions”171 regarding the extent to 
which a tribal regulatory scheme is necessary to preserve the Tribe’s rights to self-govern-
ment. As the Supreme Court recognized, “the existence and extent of a tribal court’s juris-
diction will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that 
                                                 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (reiterating the Court should defer on factual ques-
tions to “Congress, whose institutional capacity for gathering evidence and taking testimony far exceeds [the 
Court’s]”). 
 161. Turner Broad., 520 U.S. at 195-96. 
 162. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68 (granting particular deference to Congress’s judgment regarding regulation 
of the military). 
 163. Turner Broad., 520 U.S. at 595-96 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 164. Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 569. 
 165. Turner Broad., 520 U.S. at 195-96. 
 166. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)). 
 167. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 168. Turner Broad., 520 U.S. at 195-96. 
 169. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 569 (1990). 
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sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of rele-
vant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and admin-
istrative decisions.”172 Evaluating, for example, the extent to which on-reservation crime 
impacts the “political integrity, economic security, [and] health [and] welfare of the 
tribe,”173 necessarily requires that someone “weigh and ‘evaluate the results of statistical 
studies in terms of . . . local conditions.’”174 Tribal legislatures can do this “with a flexi-
bility of approach that is not available to the courts.’”175 
Moreover, Congress’s and the Executive Branch’s policy to respect tribal self-gov-
ernance requires the federal courts to defer to the judgments of Tribes regarding the factual 
basis for a Tribe’s assertion of jurisdiction over non-Indians. As recently as 2010, Con-
gress affirmed that “the United States has distinct legal, treaty, and trust obligations to 
provide for the public safety of Indian country; . . . [and that] tribal justice systems are 
often the most appropriate institutions for maintaining law and order in Indian country.”176 
In National Farmers Union Insurance Company v. Crow Tribe of Indians, the Court 
held that, where a non-member tribal court defendant challenges the tribal court’s juris-
diction, that challenge must initially be presented to the tribal court.177 This is so, the Court 
explained, because “Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-govern-
ment and self-determination. That policy favors a rule that will provide the forum whose 
jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases 
for the challenge.”178 Much like how the Constitution vests in Congress a unique obligation 
to govern the armed forces, the Court has recognized congressional policy vests in the 
tribal government the power to resolve factual questions regarding the scope of the Tribe’s 
jurisdiction over non-members as it relates to the Tribe’s powers of self-government. The 
federal courts should defer to tribal legislative findings implicating this federal policy sup-
porting tribal self-governance and inherent sovereignty. 
IV. TRIBAL ENFORCEMENT CODES 
Many Tribes have explored the use of civil remedies for addressing the problem of 
enforcing tribal law against non-Indians. The Creek Nation’s efforts in this regard were 
discussed in Part I. Other Tribes have civil enforcement laws on the books and pursue 
enforcement actions against non-Indians.179 Some utilize creative and unorthodox means 
of enforcing such laws against recalcitrant non-Indian offenders.180 To be most effective, 
                                                 
 172. Nat’l Farmers Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855-56 (1985). 
  173. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981). 
 174. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261, §202(a)(5)(A) (codified as 
amended in various sections of 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).   
 177. Nat’l Farmers Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 856-57; see also Dish Network Serv., L.L.C. v. Laducer, 725 F.3d 
877 (8th Cir. 2013) (reaffirming and applying Nat’l Farmers). 
 178. Nat’l Farmers Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 855-56. 
 179. Hopi Code § 3.4.5 (authorizing the Tribe to enforce the Tribe’s criminal code through civil damages 
actions against “[a]ny person subject to the civil jurisdiction of the Hopi Tribe, but not subject to the [Tribe’s] 
criminal jurisdiction”); Oglala Sioux Law and Order Code Ch. 2 § 20(a) (providing for “[i]mplied consent to 
Tribal Jurisdiction by Non-Members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe”). 
 180. See The Tulalip Tribes v. 2008 White Ford Econoline Van, 11 Am. Tribal Law 232 (Tulalip Ct. App. 
May 31, 2013), available at 
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however, Tribes should design their remedial schemes in such a way as to maximize the 
chances that their sanctions will survive collateral review in federal or state court. There-
fore, Tribes designing and implementing civil enforcement codes, and tribal advocates 
seeking to support tribal code enforcement in collateral federal or state court challenges, 
must be mindful of the Supreme Court’s rules governing tribal civil jurisdiction. The fol-
lowing section attempts to make the best case for aggressive tribal civil enforcement under 
the various exceptions available for the exercise of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
A. Substantive Provisions of Tribal Enforcement Codes 
1. Conditional Entry Onto Indian Lands 
As discussed in Part II.A., above, it is unclear at this time whether Montana’s limi-
tations on tribal civil jurisdiction generally apply on Indian lands. In Hicks, the Supreme 
Court at least arguably expanded the Montana rule onto Indian lands,181 and some federal 
circuit courts have adopted this position.182 The suggestion that Montana applies in full 
force on Indian lands, however, suffers from a fatal conceptual flaw—Tribes still “possess 
their traditional and undisputed power to exclude persons whom they deem to be undesir-
able from tribal lands,”183 and this power includes the lesser power “to set conditions on 
entry to that land.”184 The conditional entry power can support “licensing requirements and 
hunting regulations” and taxation.185 In fact, “[r]egulatory authority goes hand in hand 
with the power to exclude.”186 
Plainly, then, the civil enforcement code should take full advantage of the Tribe’s 
power to exclude and corollary power to regulate those individuals granted the conditional 
privilege to enter onto the Tribe’s territory. This approach may not be a magic bullet, ca-
pable of circumventing the Montana limitations in all instances. The Tribe’s power to ex-
clude might be limited with respect to fee land on the reservation,187 and in circumstances 
where a right-of-way, easement, or lease grants non-Indians an unqualified right to enter 
                                                 
http://www.nics.ws/Tulalip/Tulalip%20Tribes%20v%20%202008%20White%20Ford%20Econo-
line%20Van.pdf (applying tribal forfeiture statute against the property of a non-Indian charged with bringing 
illegal narcotics onto the Tribe’s reservation); see also Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction 
over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1049-50 n.7 (2005) (describing how a Navajo 
Nation police officer convinced the author to voluntarily pay a tribal speeding ticket in lieu of having the offense 
reported on her state driving record); Creative Civil Remedies against Non-Indian offenders in Indian Country, 
Report of the National Roundtable on Creative Civil Remedies against Non-Indians in Indian Country, 
SOUTHWEST CENTER FOR LAW AND POLICY (2008), http://www.swclap.org/up-
loads/file/d03f27dc405e4a0aa821aedf4bc7bd04/Creative%20Civil%20Remedies%20Against%20Non-In-
dian%20Offenders%20In%20Indian%20Country.pdf. 
  181. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001); see supra Part I.A.  
 182. Compare Attorney’s Process and Investigation Servs., Inc., v. Sac and Fox Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa, 
609 F.3d 927, 936 (8th Cir. 2010); McArthur v. San Juan Cnty., 497 F.3d 1057, 1069 (10th Cir. 1997), with 
Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 183. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 675, 696-97 (1990). 
 184. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2723 (2008). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 691 n.11 (1993)). See also Water Wheel, 642 F.3d 
at 810-12 (holding that, absent exceptional circumstances such as those in Hicks, the Tribe’s power to exclude 
broadly supports tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian lands). 
 187. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 558-59 (1981) (noting the alienation of fee lands to 
non-Indians implicitly overruled treaty language granting the Tribe “absolute and undisturbed use and occupa-
tion” of the Tribe’s reservation); but see Strate v. A1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 455-56 n.11 (1997) (noting the 
Tribe’s right to detain and investigate lawbreakers on the equivalent of fee lands on the reservation). 
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onto tribal property.188 Also, like in Hicks, the Tribe’s right to exclude may be limited by 
special circumstances in which the Court decides, for whatever reason, that some counter-
vailing interest overrides the Tribe’s power to exclude in extraordinary cases.189 However, 
in the run-of-the-mill case arising on Indian lands—a purse-snatching at the tribal ca-
sino,190 white-collar crime at a tribal government or business office,191 sexual assault on 
tribal government property,192 a domestic incident at a tribally-controlled housing devel-
opment193—as well as in more unusual situations—willful trespass on tribal property,194 
armed insurrection against the tribal government195—the Tribe’s exclusion power provides 
a relatively solid foundation for the Tribe’s civil regulatory enforcement scheme. 
2. Consent 
A consensual relationship between the Tribe and the regulated party provides an 
alternative theory to support tribal civil enforcement. Plainly, the purse-snatchers, drug 
mules, and serial rapists who routinely take advantage of the jurisdictional quagmire that 
is Federal Indian law are unlikely to affirmatively consent to be bound by the Tribe’s en-
forcement code, either before or after committing their crimes. But the law recognizes 
many types of consent, and the Supreme Court has never required the regulated party under 
the Montana II test to expressly consent to suit in tribal court. Synthesizing the Court’s 
various pronouncements regarding this exception,196 the consensual relationship test is 
likely to be met where (1) the Tribe and the non-Indian party enter into a consensual rela-
tionship (2) arising out of “commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrange-
ments,”197 and (3) the regulation—here, application of the civil enforcement code—arises 
out of this relationship.198 The civil enforcement code, then, should establish a relationship 
between the Tribe and the regulated party based on the doctrine of implied consent.199 The 
code should provide that any person who chooses to enter the Tribe’s jurisdiction, patron-
izes tribal or private businesses on the reservation, or avail themselves of tribal public 
                                                 
 188. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 456. 
  189. In Hicks, the Court did not expressly hold that state officers are empowered to enter onto Indian lands on 
the reservation to execute search warrants relating to off-reservation conduct, but the Court did hold that Tribes 
cannot regulate state officials executing such warrants. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 363-64 (2001). What-
ever Hicks may be, tribal advocates should take comfort in the fact that it is not typical. 
 190. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 191. See, e.g., United States v. Big Eagle, 702 F.3d 1125, 1127-29 (8th Cir. 2013) (describing a kick-back 
scheme operated by tribal elected officials). 
 192. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 1999) (describing systematic sexual assault 
and abuse of power by a tribal officer against tribal employees, occurring on property held in trust by the United 
States for the benefit of the Tribe). 
 193. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, JUDGES GUIDE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: TRIBAL 
COMMUNITIES AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 13 (2013), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Tribal-
DVBenchguide.pdf (recognizing Tribes can exclude domestic abusers from tribal housing).  
 194. Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 805-06 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 195. See Attorney’s Process and Investigation Servs., Inc., v. Sac and Fox Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 
927 (8th Cir. 2010) (detailing an armed invasion of the tribal seat of government by private investigators in the 
wake of a disputed tribal election). 
 196. See supra Part I.B. 
  197. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981) (emphasis added). 
 198. See Strate v. Al Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457 (1997). 
 199. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (9th ed. 2009) (“Consent inferred from one’s conduct rather than 
from one’s direct expression.”). See also Oglala Sioux Law and Order Code Ch. 2 § 20(a) (codifying such a 
provision). 
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services, consents to be bound by the Tribe’s code of conduct. 
While this expression of tribal jurisdiction would, in many cases, overlap with the 
previously described conditional entry theory, the implied consent provision differs from 
conditional entry in two important respects. First, implied consent may justify tribal juris-
diction in situations where the Tribe has no inherent power to exclude non-Indians (say, 
on a state highway right-of-way traversing the reservation).200 If the non-Indian individual 
knows about the implied consent provision and still chooses to enter onto the Tribe’s ju-
risdiction, implicitly accepting the Tribe’s terms of entry, this may suffice to sustain the 
Tribe’s jurisdiction under the Montana II exception even if the Tribe’s right to exclude 
does not apply. Second, the implied consent provision explicitly targets the first Montana 
exception. To the extent federal or state courts might insist the Montana analysis always 
applies on Indian lands, rejecting the notion that the Tribe’s power to exclude is sufficient, 
outside of Montana’s framework, to support tribal jurisdiction, the implied consent provi-
sion strengthens the case for jurisdiction under Montana, on both Indian and fee lands. 
There is a potential limitation to the effectiveness of the implied consent provision. 
In Atkinson Trading Company v. Shirley,201 the Supreme Court rejected the Navajo Na-
tion’s argument that non-Indian hotel guests’ receipt of tribal governmental services was 
sufficient to support the Tribe’s imposition of a hotel occupancy tax under the first Mon-
tana exception. The Court reasoned “the generalized availability of tribal services [is] pa-
tently insufficient to sustain the Tribe’s civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian 
fee land.”202 The Court proceeded to explain: 
 
The consensual relationship must stem from commercial dealing, con-
tracts, leases, or other arrangements, and a nonmember’s actual or po-
tential receipt of tribal police, fire, and medical services does not create 
the requisite connection. If it did, the exception would swallow the rule: 
All non-Indian fee lands within a reservation benefit, to some extent, 
from the “advantages of a civilized society” offered by the Indian tribe. 
Such a result does not square with our precedents; indeed, we implicitly 
rejected this argument in Strate, where we held that the nonmembers 
had not consented to the Tribes’ adjudicatory authority by availing 
themselves of the benefit of tribal police protection while traveling 
within the reservation. We therefore reject respondents’ broad reading 
of Montana’s first exception, which ignores the dependent status of In-
dian tribes and subverts the territorial restriction upon tribal power.203 
 
This passage suggests that a civil enforcement scheme that relies on expansive ap-
plication of the consensual relationship exception to reach every, or nearly every, person 
within the Tribe’s territorial boundaries might be a non-starter. But there are ways to dis-
tinguish Atkinson and make a better case for a consensual relationship exception. First, in 
Atkinson there is no argument that the tribal tax code explicitly included an implied con-
                                                 
 200. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 456. 
 201. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
 202. Id. at 655. 
 203. Id. (internal marks and citations omitted). 
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sent provision. So an explicit implied consent provision in the tribal code, expressly re-
quiring non-Indians to consent to tribal civil jurisdiction when they enter the Tribe’s terri-
tory, might fare better before the courts. Furthermore, the Court in Atkinson “d[id] not 
question the [Tribe’s] ability to charge an appropriate fee for a particular service actually 
rendered.”204 So the Court acknowledged access to tribal services is a privilege, not a right, 
and the Tribe could condition an individual’s access to such services on that individual’s 
voluntary agreement to pay a proscribed fee. 
The implied consent provision seeks to create a consensual relationship between the 
Tribe and the regulated non-Indian by exploiting this relationship between the Tribe as 
service provider and the non-Indian service recipient. When an individual enters onto the 
reservation and, in the ordinary course, takes advantage of the Tribe’s water, electricity, 
sewer systems, the protections of tribal law enforcement (to the limited extent tribal offic-
ers are permitted to enforce the laws), and myriad other services tribal governments pro-
vide, that individual has chosen to avail him or herself of the Tribe’s largess while knowing 
there is a price to be paid. And that price is eminently reasonable—all they must do is obey 
the law or accept the consequences of their failure to do so. 
This theory, of course, does not sit comfortably beside Atkinson’s admonition that 
Montana’s first exception should not “swallow the rule” by “subvert[ing] the territorial 
restriction upon tribal power.”205 In order to limit this exception’s reach, consistent with 
Atkinson, a court might find a consensual relationship of the sort described only exists 
where the regulated party accepted the benefit of a particularized and discreet tribal ser-
vice, i.e., “a particular service actually rendered.”206 But even if this is the case, it benefits 
the Tribe to establish an implied consent provision applicable to all who receive tribal 
services. This would establish unambiguously that all who receive such services are in fact 
subject to the Tribe’s jurisdiction and its civil enforcement code, giving fair notice to ser-
vice recipients that they are expected to comply with tribal laws, and providing clear and 
uniform standards to guide tribal attorneys and courts in implementing the civil remedies 
provisions against non-Indians. That such provisions could improve the odds of tribal reg-
ulation and adjudication surviving collateral judicial review is an added bonus.  
3. Direct Effects 
If one were to poll one-hundred legislators—local, state, federal, and tribal—and ask 
what single recurring social problem most substantially threatens “the political integrity, 
the economic security, [and] the health [and] welfare” of their communities,207 one of the 
most common answers would surely be: crime. Violent crime, crime against property, drug 
crime, crime against citizens, crime against outsiders—external business partners and tour-
ists and passers-through. It is no exaggeration to say that crime, largely unchecked on 
Indian reservations across the country, truly imperils the right and ability of Indian Tribes 
to “make their own laws and be governed by them.”208 The epidemic of crime in reserva-
tion communities, including staggering rates of violence against Indian women and the 
                                                 
 204. Id. at 655. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 655. 
 207. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). 
 208. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001). 
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targeted activities of international drug cartels, beyond any doubt threatens the political 
integrity and health and welfare of Indian Tribes to their very core.209 
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts may not necessarily agree that specific 
acts of crime or violence on Indian reservations sufficiently imperil tribal self-governance 
to support civil jurisdiction over individual offenders. In Strate, for instance, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that unsafe driving on the reservation “endanger[ed] all in the vicin-
ity . . . [and] jeopardized the safety of tribal members” but found “[n]either regulatory nor 
adjudicatory authority over the state highway accident at issue [was] needed to preserve 
‘the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.’”210 Simi-
larly, federal courts of appeals have decided the “generalized threat that torts by or against 
its members pose for any [society] is not what the second Montana exception is intended 
to capture.”211 These courts disregard the aggregate effects of the conduct Tribes attempt 
to regulate, asking only whether any particular instance, taken in isolation, actually poses 
an existential threat to the very existence of the tribal community. Some do,212 but most do 
not. The rest merely threaten the life, health, safety, economic security, and general well-
being of the people who are the immediate victims of these unregulated crimes and torts 
on reservation communities. 
Tribal civil regulatory codes, then, must target this exception by equating the threat 
such crimes pose to individuals with the core political integrity and general welfare of the 
community. Here, legislative fact-finding is the key. As noted above,213 courts defer to 
legislatures to determine facts bearing on important public policy matters, and tribal leg-
islatures should be accorded particular deference in light of Congress’s policies respecting 
tribal self-governance. Tribal legislatures should make explicit factual findings—in appro-
priate detail, relying on specific statistical data and the documented testimony of experts 
and community members—explaining why the civil regulatory scheme is necessary to 
preserve tribal self-government and support the health, safety and welfare of their com-
munities. State and federal courts cannot possibly understand the extent to which rampant, 
unchecked pick-pocketry at tribal casinos (not to mention domestic violence or the drug 
trade) truly harms the economy, public safety, and the well being of the community. This 
is a classic matter of legislative concern, and the courts’ institutional disadvantage in de-
ciding these issues counsels deferring to the Tribe’s legislative judgments. 
Even if the courts require proof that the non-member’s conduct “imperils the sub-
sistence or welfare of the tribe” and the Tribe’s regulation and adjudication regarding that 
conduct is “necessary to avert catastrophic consequences,”214 the tribal legislatures (and 
tribal courts)215 are in the best position to determine whether this is the case in light of the 
particular circumstances of their tribal communities. 
                                                 
 209. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. 
 210. Strate v. A1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457-59 (1997). 
 211. Attorney’s Process and Investigation Servs., Inc., v. Sac and Fox Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 
927, 939 (8th Cir. 2010); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. King Mountain Tobacco Co., 569 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 212. See Attorney’s Process and Investigation Servs., Inc., 609 F.3d at 931-34, 940 (armed insurrection against 
tribal government). 
 213. See supra Part II.B. 
 214. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2726 (2008). 
 215. See Nat’l Farmers Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855-56 (1985). 
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B. Enforcement216 
The preceding discussion suggests a method for Tribes to assert the power to regu-
late the conduct of non-Indians on the reservation to promote public safety, general health 
and wellness, and desirable social conduct on the reservation—essentially to enforce crim-
inal law norms and standards through civil mechanisms. This leads to the question: How 
might a Tribe enforce a civil sanction or penalty imposed under this legal structure? There 
are a number of potential enforcement mechanisms, which may be effective given the 
proper circumstances.  
1. Seizure of Property 
Tribes will often have effective enforcement mechanisms if the individual to be pun-
ished has property located on the reservation or within the Tribe’s sphere of influence. 
Recall the Yellow Hummer Case.217 In that case, the Tribe seized the civil offender’s vehi-
cle—the eponymous yellow Hummer—when the offender and his vehicle were literally in 
the Tribe’s custody within the Tribe’s territorial jurisdiction. The officers simply im-
pounded the vehicle upon suspicion that it had been used in the commission of a crime on 
the reservation. The Nation’s courts perfected the seizure in a subsequent in rem civil for-
feiture proceeding against the vehicle itself. And, as discussed above, the seizure survived 
collateral review in federal court because the Tribe asserted sovereign immunity. Thus, if 
the Tribe is able to seize individual property before the property owner can bring a defen-
sive action in federal court to enjoin the Tribe’s assertion of jurisdiction,218 the Tribe can 
enforce civil remedies against a non-Indian defendant without having to justify the seizure 
in federal court. Tribal law and tribal courts will be able to determine whether the seizure 
was justified.219 
2. Domesticating Tribal Court Judgments in State Court 
Indian Tribes may enforce a valid tribal court judgment against a non-Indian defend-
ant by domesticating the judgment in a jurisdiction where the defendant or his property 
can be reached.220 This is the traditional way to enforce any judgment when the defendant 
                                                 
 216. The remedies discussed in this section are not intended to be exclusive. Tribes can, and should, utilize 
any remedies traditionally available under tribal law or in American courts, and develop new remedies designed 
to meet the unique problems faced by modern tribal court systems. 
 217. Yellow Hummer Case, S.C. 05-01, 4 Mvs. L. Rep 253 (Creek Nation 2005); see also Miner Elec. Inc. v. 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 503 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 218. In Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C., v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011), the non-Indian law firm won an 
injunction in federal court preventing the Tribe from seizing attorney fees the Tribe had already paid to the law 
firm.  
 219. It should not be assumed that the procedural protections available to non-Indian defendants in tribal court 
will fall short of the standards of federal or state courts. In The Tulalip Tribes v. 2008 White Ford Econoline Van, 
for instance, the Tulalip Tribal Court of Appeals heard an appeal in an action to forfeit a vehicle which the non-
Indian appellant had used illegally to transport and sell marijuana on the Tribe’s reservation. In spite of the 
appellant’s multiple procedural defaults, the Court of Appeals (on its own initiative) granted the appellant exten-
sions and relief from default, agreed with appellant that forfeiture of the vehicle under tribal law could constitute 
an “excessive fine,” and remanded to the tribal trial court to determine the vehicle’s value and other facts relevant 
to determining whether the penalty was in fact excessive. No. TUL-CV-AP-2012-0404, available at 
http://www.nics.ws/Tulalip/Tulalip%20Tribes%20v%20%202008%20White%20Ford%Econoline%20Van.pdf.  
 220. See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 7.07[2][b] (2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK].  
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or his property cannot be reached by the court that rendered the judgment.221 The relevant 
issue here is the extent to which the state courts will choose to recognize tribal court judg-
ments.222 Some state courts grant full faith and credit to tribal court judgments, while oth-
ers enforce such judgments as a matter of comity.223 Under either model, the state court 
will decline to enforce a tribal court judgment if the judgment exceeded the tribal court’s 
jurisdiction.224 Thus, in order for the Tribe to enforce a civil judgment against a non-Indian 
or his property located outside of the Tribe’s jurisdiction, the Tribe will likely have to 
prove that it had jurisdiction under federal law to enter the judgment in the first place. 
3. Civil Contempt Incarceration 
The Tribe might also enforce the civil monetary penalty by incarcerating a willfully 
non-compliant civil defendant, through the process of civil contempt. It is a firmly embed-
ded feature of common law justice systems that, where a recalcitrant party refuses to com-
ply with a lawful court order, the court has the equitable power to incarcerate that defend-
ant until she is ready to comply with the court’s orders.225 Thus, if a tribal court imposes a 
civil sanction on a non-Indian defendant and that defendant has the ability to pay the fine 
but refuses to do so, the Tribe would be well within its rights to detain her until she decides 
that paying the fine would be preferable to remaining in custody. 
Civil contempt incarceration of a non-Indian defendant should not raise any prob-
lems under Oliphant.226 The purpose of civil contempt incarceration is not to penalize the 
detainee; it is a purely civil remedy designed to encourage compliance with a lawful court 
order.227 Therefore, civil contempt is (by definition) not a criminal penalty to which the 
Oliphant rule could apply. 
As recently as 2011, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this distinction, 
deciding that a state imposing civil contempt on an individual for failing to pay child sup-
port had no obligation to provide that individual with legal counsel, even though the im-
position of an equivalent criminal sanction would have given rise to a constitutional right 
to appointment of counsel.228 “Civil contempt differs from criminal contempt,” the Court 
reasoned, “in that [civil contempt] seeks only to ‘coerce the defendant to do’ what a court 
had previously ordered him to do.”229 And unlike a criminal punishment, the civil detainee 
“carries the keys of [her] prison in [her] own pockets,”230 because she has the right to be 
released at any time, so long as she agrees to comply with the court’s orders. 
To be sure, the federal courts will closely scrutinize any effort by Indian Tribes to 
                                                 
 221. Cf. REV. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, Prefatory Note (“The usual practice re-
quires that an action be commenced on the foreign judgment.”), available at http://www.uniform-
laws.org/shared/docs/enforcement%20of%20judgments/enforjdg64.pdf.  
 222. See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 220, §7.07[2][b]. 
 223. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Buehl, 555 P.2d 1334 (Wash. 1976) (full faith and credit); John v. Baker, 982 
P.2d 738, 763 (Alaska 1999) (comity); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 220, §7.07[2][b].   
 224. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 220, §7.07[2][a]; see also Buehl, 555 P.2d at 1334 (deciding 
whether Tribe had jurisdiction to enter a child custody order prior to granting the order full faith and credit).   
 225. See Turner v. Rodgers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011). 
 226. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).  
 227. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2516. 
 228. Id. at 2520. 
 229. Id. at 2516 (quoting Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911)).  
 230. Id. (quoting Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 633 (1988)). 
29
Tinker: In Search of a Civil Solution: Tribal Authority to Regulate NonMe
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014
222 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:193 
incarcerate non-Indians for violations of tribal law, even if the proceedings are inherently 
civil in nature. The detainee will have the right to challenge her incarceration in federal 
court through the habeas corpus provision in the Indian Civil Rights Act.231 Among other 
concerns, the courts are certain to question whether the Tribe had jurisdiction to impose 
the civil penalty in light of the limitations on tribal jurisdiction under Montana.232 Thus, 
civil contempt incarceration will, as a rule, only be effective in cases where the Tribe can 
convince a federal court the underlying civil judgment was within the Tribe’s jurisdiction. 
There may be only one published federal court decision regarding a tribal court’s 
civil contempt authority over a non-Indian. In United States v. Blackfeet Tribe of the Black-
feet Indian Reservation, federal authorities attempted to seize allegedly illegal gambling 
devices, and the Tribe, in order to protect its interest in the devices, threatened the agents 
with contempt.233 The federal agents sought a protective order in federal court, and the 
court found the Tribe was without power to interfere with the federal agent’s law enforce-
ment activities.234 The holding in Blackfeet Tribe is based on the supremacy of federal law 
and the immunity of federal law enforcement officers.235 There is no indication that Black-
feet Tribe signals a broader prohibition against tribal courts exercising the powers of con-
tempt, and there do not seem to be any additional federal court opinions addressing the 
issue.236 Absent special circumstances like those of Blackfeet Tribe, it is presumed that 
Tribes retain the inherent sovereign power to utilize civil contempt incarceration to enforce 
valid tribal court orders.237 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The law and order crisis in Indian Country is appalling in it scope. And Tribes cannot 
afford to wait for the federal government to solve the problem, or even to get out of the 
way. People are suffering now, and things are just getting worse. Tribes must find a way 
to take matters into their own hands, to develop an inherent sovereignty solution to the 
problem. 
The approach outlined in this paper may be one of the few viable options under 
                                                 
 231. 25 U.S.C. §1303 (2012). 
 232. Cf. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194-95 (1978) (granting habeas corpus relief under 
the Indian Civil Rights Act where the prosecution of a non-Indian defendant exceeded federal limitations on 
tribal jurisdiction).  
 233. United States v. Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 364 F. Supp. 192, 194 (D. Mont. 
1973). 
 234. Id. at 194-95.   
 235. See, e.g., United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 784 F.2d 917, 920 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Black-
feet Tribe for the proposition that Tribes are “without authority to restrict federal officials in their conduct of 
official business on the Reservation”); see also United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 860 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (same). This rationale is arguably consistent with the Hicks Court’s subsequent holding that tribal 
sovereignty does not permit Tribes to interfere with state agents entering the Tribe’s jurisdiction to investigate 
off-reservation crime. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364-65 (2001). 
 236. Cf. FLETCHER, MATTHEW L. M., A PRIMER ON TRIBAL COURT CONTEMPT POWER 11 (MSU LEGAL 
STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 06-08, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1134936 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1134936. See also Creative Civil Remedies against Non-Indian offenders in Indian 
Country, Report of the National Roundtable on Creative Civil Remedies against Non-Indians in Indian Country, 
SOUTHWEST CENTER FOR LAW AND POLICY (2008), http://swclap.org/pdfs/Creative%20Civil%20Reme-
dies%20Against%20Non-Indian%20Offenders%20In%20Indian%20Country.pdf. 
 237. See Creative Civil Remedies, supra note 180, at 23. 
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current law,238 to allow Indian Tribes to enforce their laws, and protect their citizens. Com-
prehensive civil regulatory codes return the mechanisms of justice to the proper author-
ity—the local (tribal) government—which is in the best position to understand community 
needs and values, and is politically accountable to the people it is charged to protect. 
“When Tribal law enforcement and courts are supported—rather than discouraged—from 
taking primary responsibility over the dispensation of local justice, they are often better, 
stronger, faster, and more effective in providing justice in Indian country than their non-
Native counterparts located elsewhere.”239 Tribes currently possess all of the tools neces-
sary to implement an inherent sovereignty solution to the epidemic of non-Indian crime in 





MODEL TRIBAL CIVIL ENFORCEMENT CODE PROVISIONS 
I. Preamble 
This Act is established under the inherent sovereign authority of [NAME OF 
TRIBE] (Tribe) to strengthen tribal self-government; provide protection for persons and 
property within the Tribe’s territorial jurisdiction; promote the health, safety and general 
welfare of the tribal community; protect business expectations and encourage economic 
development within the Tribe’s jurisdiction; preserve the Tribe’s unique cultural heritage, 
community identity, traditions and values; and to enforce the rule of tribal law. 
II. Findings240 
WHEREAS 
American Indians are victims of violent crime at a rate more than twice that of 
any other racial or ethnic sub-group.[241] 
 
 American Indians are victimized by rape at a rate more than twice that of any 
other racial or ethnic sub-group.[242] Domestic and sexual violence against Amer-
ican Indian and Alaska Native women has reached epidemic proportions.[243] 
 
                                                 
 238. The bipartisan Tribal Law and Order Commission recommends, in a 2013 report, Congressional action 
to restore inherent criminal jurisdiction to federally recognized tribal governments. INDIAN LAW AND ORDER 
COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 25, Recommendation 1.1. Congress should certainly follow the Commission’s 
counsel, but until federal authorities decide to act, Tribes should be implementing their own solutions. 
 239. Id. at 17.  
 240. The findings and citations in this section are included for purposes of illustration only. The most effective 
legislative findings—those likely to garner the greatest deference from the federal courts—will be based upon 
the research and conclusions of well-credentialed experts, reflecting the specific circumstances of the affected 
tribal community. 
 241. STEVEN W. PERRY, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 4 (2004), available at http://www.jus-
tice.gov/otj/pdf/american_indians_and_crime.pdf. 
 242. Id. at 5. 
 243. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261, §202(a)(5)(A) (codified as 
amended in various sections of 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).   
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 Non-Indians are responsible for 66% of violent crime, and 86% of rapes, com-
mitted against Indians.[244]   
 
 Drug and alcohol dependency substantially contributes to instances of domestic 
violence, burglary, assault, and child abuse in the tribal community.[245] 
 
 The Tribe possesses the inherent sovereign authority to make laws and govern 
within the Tribe’s territorial jurisdiction.[246] 
 
 Policies of the United States restricting the ability of Indian Tribes to enforce the 
rule of law and promote public safety within their borders by regulating non-In-
dian lawbreakers has a significant negative impact on the Tribe’s ability to pro-
vide public safety to Indian communities and has been increasingly exploited by 
criminals who target reservation communities and tribal citizens.[247] 
 
 The United States Congress and the President of the United States have acknowl-
edged that tribal justice systems are often the most appropriate institutions for 
maintaining law and order and promoting public safety in Indian Country.[248]   
 
 The Tribe possesses inherent sovereign authority to exercise civil regulatory and 
adjudicative jurisdiction over non-Indians within the Tribe’s Indian Country.[249] 
 
 The Tribe possesses inherent sovereign authority to exclude any person from 
tribal territory, including non-Indians, and this power includes the power to stop, 
detain, and investigate persons suspected of violating tribal law.[250] 
 
 The Tribe can condition an individual’s privilege to enter the Tribe’s territory, 
conduct business within such territory or with the Tribe or Tribe-members, and 
enjoy the benefits of tribal governmental services upon the individual’s consent 
to be subject to tribal law, including tribal civil regulatory and adjudicative juris-
diction.[251] 
 
 Criminal activity victimizing Indian and non-Indian individuals within the Tribe’s 
territory threatens the political integrity, economic security, and health and wel-
fare of the Tribe.[252] 
 
 Regulating criminal activity by non-Indians within the Tribe’s territory is neces-
sary to preserve the Tribe’s right to make its own laws and be ruled by them.[253] 
                                                 
 244. Perry, supra note 241, at 9. 
 245. Tribal Law and Order Act, §202(a)(5)(A).  
 246. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220, 223 (1959). 
 247. Tribal Law and Order Act, §202(a)(4). 
 248. Id. §202(a)(2)(B).  
 249. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). 
 250. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696-97 (1990). 
 251. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 US 679, 688 (1993); see Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 
144-48 (1982). 
 252. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66; see Attorney’s Process and Investigation Servs., Inc., v. Sac and Fox Tribe 
of the Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 939-40 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 253. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (“Tribal assertion of regulatory authority over nonmembers 
must be connected to that right of the Indians to make their own laws and be governed by them.”). 
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III. Jurisdiction 
 Personal and In Rem Jurisdiction: This Act shall apply, without limitation, to all 
persons and property located within the Tribe’s territorial jurisdiction, and to all 
conduct taking place within said jurisdiction. The [NAME OF TRIBAL COURT] 
shall have jurisdiction over all persons and property subject to the Act.  
 
 Subject Matter Jurisdiction: 
 Any person who voluntarily enters onto the Tribe’s territorial juris-
diction, enters into or transacts business with the Tribe or Tribe-
members, or takes advantage of tribal public services or business or 
commercial opportunities available within said territory, will con-
clusively be deemed to have consented to tribal regulatory and ad-
judicative jurisdiction, including but not limited to this Act. The 
consensual relationship established under this provision exists be-
tween the Tribe and the regulated person, as well as between the 
regulated person and any other person or persons protected under 
tribal law. 
 
 Additionally, any person who engages in conduct regulated by this 
Act shall be subject to tribal regulatory and adjudicative jurisdic-
tion, regardless of consent, because conduct regulated by this Act 
directly effects the political integrity; economic security; health, 
safety, and welfare of the Tribe, and such conduct is directly con-
nected to the Tribe’s ability to make its own laws and the right of 
the tribal community to be governed by such laws. 
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